Cognitivism

According to Smith, the Moral Problem consists in the tension between three ideas: that moral judgments motivate by themselves, that beliefs don’t motivate by themselves, and that moral judgments are beliefs. Chapter 2 of The Moral Problem presents Smith’s reasons for thinking that moral judgments really are beliefs.

The thesis that moral judgments are beliefs is called cognitivism, and the contrary thesis that moral judgments are really a very different kind of mental state, more like a desire, is called noncognitivism. So another way of describing Smith’s goal in chapter 2 is as explaining why we should not take the moral problem to provide us with an argument for noncognitivism.

The Classical Argument for Noncognitivism

The idea that we should take the moral problem to be an argument for noncognitivism is as old as noncognitivism itself. We might call it the classical argument for noncognitivism, because it is so central to the traditional reasons why philosophers have been attracted to this view. And because moral realism entails cognitivism, that means that the classical argument for noncognitivism is itself an argument against moral realism. It is one of the two main challenges to moral realism that we will consider this semester.

Reading

To prepare for class, please read chapter 2 of The Moral Problem. As you read, watch out for the best reasons that Smith offers for thinking that moral judgments really are beliefs. Do you find them persuasive? Which objections to this view worry him the most? Do you agree that those objections are the most worrisome?

Class

We will hold class ONLINE ONLY today - unfortunately there will be a large construction project unfolding at my house starting this morning and so I can only hold class online. We will use the Zoom link that you see for our course when you log into Zoom, which is https://usc.zoom.us/j/93158804637?pwd=L3FuanNJU1lwTCtvelAxM0t2WnAxUT09. On Wednesday we will return to our normal pattern and meet in person on campus.