Hedonism

Although Moore begins Principia Ethica with a metaethical thesis - about the nature of goodness - his main motivation in the book is actually to advance a normative ethical thesis - about what is good. In Moore’s time as today, philosophers divided over whether there is only one ultimate good, or instead two or more different kinds of thing are good in their own right.

Monists say that only one thing is ultimately good, and pluralists say more than one. The most common kind of monism about the good in Moore’s time and one of the most common throughout the history of western philosophy is the idea that pleasure is the only thing that is good in its own right. This view is called hedonism. One of Moore’s chief aims in Principia Ethica is to undermine the appeal of hedonism by trying to show that there is no particular reason why we should expect monism to be true.

Reading

Please read sections 36-57 of Principia Ethica, which cover the bulk of chapter 3. These chapters contain Moore’s attempts to use his reasoning in chapter 1 to create trouble for hedonism. As you read, ask yourself: what does Moore understand hedonism to say? What does Moore think the appeal of hedonism is, to those who accept it? Is Moore’s diagnosis of the appeal of hedonism an attractive one? Does it make sense that this is the main sort of thing to be said in favor of hedonism? Are you persuaded by Moore that hedonism is false?