Judgment Internalism

Judgment Internalism is the standard name that philosophers give for what he calls the practicality requirement. Whatever we call it, this is the idea that moral judgments can motivate all by themselves, and without the help of a desire. Judgment internalism is intuitive and as we’ve already seen, is appealed to by many different philosophers. But Smith offers a new and interesting argument in chapter 3 of The Moral Problem that tries to be careful enough to show that it really is moral judgments that are motivating by themselves, and not some subtle effect of a desire that we are not noticing.

Reading

As you read Smith’s chapter, try to think about why we need to focus on the cases of people who have recently changed their moral views, as Smith does, in order to screen off the possibility that someone is being motivated by a desire. Why does Smith think that these cases show that it cannot be a desire that motivates someone? What does that have to do with Williams’ point about “one thought too many”? Are you convinced? Or how would you resist his argument?