Theories of Self-Defense
Where We Are
Last class's reading, from Helen Frowe, introduced several theories about why it is permissible to kill in self-defense, one of which was the rights-based theory of Judith Jarvis Thomson (also of famous violinist fame). For this class we are reading a famous article by Thomson in which she lays out this theory and contrasts it with alternatives. Many of the points and comparisons that she makes are ones that Frowe also explains in her chapter, but because Thomson is writing for an audience of professional philosophers and Frowe is writing for an audience of undergraduate students, you will likely find Thomson's line of reasoning harder to follow (I do, too).
To make sure that you are understanding what is going on in the Thomson reading, make sure that you stop yourself after each section, ask yourself what new point she was trying to make in that section, and ask yourself whether it corresponds to a point that Frowe made, either in her section about the rights-based view, or in another section of her chapter. If it takes you less than a few hours to work through Thomson's paper and understand what is going on in it, then you are probably missing a lot. Like her earlier paper on abortion that we read in Unit 2, there is a lot going on in this paper, and you don't want to miss it.
Rights
The key ideas behind Thomson's rights-based account of self-defense are that rights help to explain what we are morally obligated or permitted to do, that in at least some cases, rights can be given up or transferred, and that you do not need to be morally culpable or responsible for a choice, in order to give up one of your rights. Let's take these ideas one by one.
Idea 1: Rights help to explain what we are morally obligated or permitted to do.
Here is an example to illustrate the intuitive force of this idea: Caroline owns a doll, Chloe. It is okay - permissible - for her to sleep with Chloe, just because she wants to. William doesn't own Chloe - she belongs to his sister. So it is not permissible for William to sleep with Chloe, just because he wants to. He needs to first get permission from his sister. In this example, it seems obvious that what Caroline and William are allowed or permitted to do with the doll Chloe is different, and that this difference is explained by who owns the doll. But what ownership is, is a kind of right - what we generally call a "property right". What it means to own something is to have the right to do certain things with it, and to restrict access to others doing similar things with it, without your permission. So since Caroline's permission to sleep with Chloe is explained by her ownership, it is explained by rights. This makes plausible the idea that rights can be explanatory of obligations and permissions, in general.
Idea 2: Rights can, at least in some cases, be given up or transferred.
Not all rights can be given up or transferred - in the language of the Declaration of Independence, for example, some rights are said to be inalienable. That means that nothing you can do can give them up - for example, maybe you cannot sell yourself into slavery. But here is an example to illustrate the intuitive force of the idea that some rights can be alienated - meaning, given up. Suppose that Caroline is not sure what to do for William for his birthday, but notices that he has often been asking for permission to play with her doll, Chloe. Caroline could give William Chloe as a present. After she gives Chloe to William, William will come to own Chloe. Now William has the right to use Chloe, and it is permissible for him to sleep with Chloe just because he wants to, but Caroline cannot take Chloe to bed without William's permission. If ownership is a property right, then since ownership can be alienated - that is, given up or transferred - at least some important rights can be given up.
Idea 3: You do not need to be culpable, or morally responsible, in order to alienate your rights.
Here is an example to illustrate the intuitive force of this idea: Caroline is sleepwalking, and goes and pushes her Amazon Dash button for Cheez-Its twenty times. The next day, twenty cases of Cheez-Its show up at her door and her credit card has been charged $399.80. Just like giving something away is a way of alienating your property rights to it, so is making a transaction - in fact, making a purchase is just a kind of trade, where you transfer your property right over one thing to someone who transfers their property right over another thing to you. But as the Amazon Dash case shows, you can make a transaction that you are not culpable or responsible for - for example, while you are sleepwalking, or even just by turning over in bed, if you make the mistake of keeping your Cheez-Its Amazon Dash button in bed with you. But this doesn't mean that you haven't made the transaction. Caroline really is now the owner of twenty brand-new cases of Cheez-Its, and her credit card balance really is now $399.80 higher than it was yesterday. So examples like this, although they are more contentious than the last two examples, strongly suggest that at least for the kinds of rights that can most clearly be alienated, you can alienate them even without being responsible for what you do.
The Reading
You can find Thomson's article here. As I said above, read slowly and carefully, and go back to compare Frowe's discussion as often as you find it helpful. Here are two big questions that I want you to think about, in particular:
What resources does Thomson's rights-based account have to explain the proportionality requirement on self-defense?
What resources does Thomson's rights-based account have to explain the necessity requirement on self-defense?
I suspect that one of these questions is harder to answer than the other, and that will be one of the things we want to discuss in class.
Handout 8.1
Here.