Solving the Moral Problem

This week we finally get to Smith’s solution to the Moral Problem. HIs solution is actually simpler than he makes it sound, so try hard while you are reading to separate the wheat from the chaff. But in chapter 5 of The Moral Problem he explains why judgments about reasons will motivate rational people, even though judgments about reasons are beliefs, and the Humean Theory of Motivation is true.

Our Reading

Our reading for Monday is chapter 5 of The Moral Problem. I hope that you will read it all, but I’m also going to warn you in advance that almost everything that is most important is in sections 5.9 and 5.10. Section 5.9 is quite long, so together these take up about the second half of the chapter. The first eight sections are kind of Smith’s transition to section 5.9, motivating why he is turning to the question that he does in 5.9.

But…

But the simple answer to why he turns to the subject that he does in sections 5.9 and 5.10 is that he thinks that there is a puzzle that is perfectly analogous to the Moral Problem but is about reasons, rather than rightness. According to this puzzle, reason-judgments are beliefs, reason-judgments motivate without the help of a desire, but beliefs don’t motivate by themselves. The only difference between this puzzle and the original Moral Problem, Smith thinks, is that this problem is easier to solve. So in sections 5.9 and 5.10, Smith gives his solution to this, easier, puzzle. Then in chapter 6 the trick to solving the Moral Problem is going to be arguing that the Moral Problem is really just a special case of this more general problem about reasons. (If I were writing Smith’s book, I would have done this in the reverse order - first arguing that the Moral Problem is just a special case of the more general problem, and then solving the more general problem. But I didn’t get to write Smith’s book and this is how he does it.)