Finishing up with Smith’s Solution

Okay, this is the end of Smith. In chapter 5 he showed how he could use the rationality loophole in order to explain how it could be true that reason-judgments motivate even though they are beliefs and beliefs don’t motivate. In this chapter he uses this to solve the Moral Problem by arguing that moral judgments are reason-judgments.

Recall

Recall from chapter 5 that Smith’s solution to the puzzle about how reason-judgments motivate had two key parts. First, he defended an answer to what reason-judgments are about. And then, he defended an answer about what practical rationality does. Reason-judgments, according to Smith, are judgments about what you would desire yourself to do if you were fully rational. And what practical rationality does, is make you desire to do things that you believe you would desire yourself to do if you were fully rational. So together, these two claims explain why someone who makes a reason judgment will be caused to desire to do the thing that they believe they have a reason to do. So together, these explain why reason-judgments will motivate rational people: rational people will come to have a desire when they have a reason-judgment, and the desire will motivate them - which is consistent with the Humean Theory of Motivation.

So

So all that he needs to add in this chapter to this solution is that moral judgments (“right”-judgments, in particular) are judgments about what you have a reason to do. If they are, then everything that goes for reason-judgments will go for right-judgments as well.

Reading

Read chapter 6 of The Moral Problem for class - it is short, and goes back and explains why Smith thinks his view is better than alternatives. And because it doesn’t add a lot that is new compared to chapter 5, it will provide us with a good opportunity to review what happened in chapter 5 once more.